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Introduction
The number of Japanese subsidiaries or
joint-ventures in Malaysia has significantly
increased in the past decade. The aim of
the present study is to identify their pattern
of management adaptation to the specific
environment in Malaysia. The underlying
hypothesis is that the style of business
management originating in one country
adapts itself to the foreign environment
when it must be practiced abroad. For
our purposes it is desirable to have a con-
ception of Japanese enterprise management
and understanding of the relations between
the Japanese management and the special
business environment in Japan. There
are many works on this subject, but they
are rarely based on empirical findings, so
that no established body of knowledge on
the real practice of Japanese management
in Japan is available. Thus, the present
author has chosen several characteristics of
Japanese style management, as described
in most business management books,and
examined how these were practiced in
Malaysia.
Malaysian joint-enterprises of Japanese
origin can hardly be regarded as inde-




pendent business concerns in the sense that
they are able to control various factors of
production and scarce resources under the
control of their own top management. It
may be more appropriate to see them as
integrated into the central control system
of the parent companies, which usually
control capital budget, distribution of
technological know-how or patents, ex-
patriate administrative staff, the supply of
raw materials and the destination of sales.
Therefore, the degree of freedom of man-
agement left to the Malaysian subsidiaries
is very limited.
The process of adaptation to the local
environment may be divided into two stages.
The first stage is the parent company's
own adaptation of its international business
strategy, and the second the adaptation of
Malaysian subsidiaries or joint-ventures
to the local environment given their limited
degree of freedom in management. The
first stage of adaptation to Malaysia is
quite limited, because the parent company's
strategy must be adjusted to the local
conditions in host countries all over the
world. In addition, the parent company
must optimally allocate its management
and economic resources throughout its
network of subsidiaries abroad. Overall
efficiency requirements sometimes make the
parent company sacrifice adaptation to
some local conditions.
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The present study is concerned mainly
with the second stage of adaptation.
Nevertheless, it is important to understand
the first stage from the Malaysian point
of view before dealing with the problems
associated with the second stage. Since
our questionnaire survey does not cover the
problems of the first stage, we rely upon
previous studies on the first stage problems.
The second stage of adaptation, however,
can be examined on the basis of our ques-
tionnaires, administered to Malaysian ~ub­
sidiaries or joint-ventures of Japanese
origin in 1982 which covered all those
companies in the manufacturing sector
of the JETRO Kuala Lumpur Represent-
ative Office list. Three sheets of our
questionnaire schedules were sent to each
company, one for the Japanese top manager
(in Japanese) and two for local middle
managers or supervisors (in English). The
questionnaire for Japanese top managers
asked how, to what extent, and in what
fields they were trying to adjust their
management practices to the Malaysian
environment. On the other hand, the
Malaysian middle managers or supervisors
were asked how they saw the management
practices in their companies and how they
are responding to those practices.
For the purpose of the present study the
information collected has been processed
simply to tabulate the responses. An
advanced statistical analysis has been left
for the future.




1. Three Phases of Organizational Evolu-
tion in Transnational Corporations
Within the framework of international
business strategy, vanous functions of
management are usually divided between
the parent companies and their subsidiaries.
This allocation pattern changes as the
organizational structure of the parent
companies evolves. On this subject there
are three important contributions by Stop-
ford and Wells [1971], Yoshino [1979] and
Sim [1978]. Stopford and Wells [1971:
29] demonstrate in their study of 187
US-based multinational corporations that
there existed three clearly identifiable
phases in the evolution of the organizational
structure of these companies in relation to
their international investment. In the
first phase, when international investment
is still small, their foreign subsidiaries
enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy.
The second phase is one of organizational
consolidation, usually accompanied by the
creation of a specialized unit in the parent
company to serve specifically the needs of
international business. In this second
phase, the parent companies' control over
subsidiaries is tightened and systematized.
If, however, international business con-
tinues to grow and becomes so important
to the parent company that it can no longer
entrust control solely to the international
division, there will be increasing pressure
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to dissolve it, and eventually the inter-
national business will be integrated into
the mainstream of the parent company's
activities. This is the third phase, where
the relationships between parent companies
and their subsidiaries will be more com-
plicated and refined.
M. Y. Yoshino [1979: 148] found that
Japanese corporations had followed a
closely parallel pattern up to a certain point.
According to his study of 35 large Japanese
manufacturing corporations that had been
active in developing manufacturing abroad,
five were in the first phase of organizational
development, and the remaining 30 in the
second phase; none had reached the third
phase.
The initial stage of overseas direct invest-
ment is usually a response to import sub-
stitution programs in the host countries.
It is often ad hoc or a reluctant response to
a specific threat. It is rare, therefore, for
such activity to be undertaken as a part of
grand corporate designs or strategies at
this stage. The organizational responses
of Japanese parent companies are also ad
hoc or arbitrary. Simply because the ex-
port department is considered to have the
necessary skills, or because foreign direct
investment is considered to be no more
than an extension of export activities, the
responsibility for international business
IS assigned to the export department.
Sometimes the corporate planning division
is chosen instead, if the export department
is deemed inappropriate for this function.
According to Yoshino [ibid.: 149], at this
stage foreign subsidiaries enjoy a con-
siderable degree of autonomy, granted not
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by conscious design but as a result of
indifference and lack of knowledge on the
part of the parent company. The re-
lationship between the subsidiary and the
parent company is likely to rely heavily
on personal ties.
The same study [ibid.: 153-158] found
that the second phase of organizational
development in the Japanese parent com-
panies is also characterized by the estab-
lishment of a specialized division: Kaigai
Jigyo Bu (Department of Overseas Busi-
ness). Initially it tends to primarily serve
other divisions and plays only a very
limited role in policy and strategy formu-
lation. The relationship between the inter-
national division and the subsidiaries at
this stage is not based on the organizational
system and tends to remain static. The
former has no power to impose and orderly
relationship, and the latter feel no compel-
ling need to establish a formal and exclusive
relationship with the former. The manag-
ers of overseas subsidiaries are likely to
continue to communicate with various
departments in the parent company through
the informal relations they have developed
prior to the creation of the international
division.
Yoshino points out, furthermore, that
the next stage is likely to evolve in the
second phase with the growth of inter-
national business. The international divi-
sion strengthens its position and standard-
izes the procedures for regularly obtaining
operating data from the subsidiaries. Then
it openly discourages direct communications
between the subsidiaries and other divisions
but can not yet devise strategies for inter-
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national business. New investments are
still made without specific policy guidelines
and evaluation criteria. The relationship
between the subsidiaries and the inter-
national division is closer than in the first
stage and gradually becomes fluid, unstable
and ambivalent, because conflicts and
power jockeying increase among the various
departments as they attempt to gain a
greater influence on international business.
The third stage of the organizational
development of the international division
is characterized by its stable relationship
with subsidiaries and other departments
of the parent company. The international
division is able to exert a strong influence
in shaping policies and decisions, in the
evaluation of new investment opportunities,
and the management of established sub-
sidiaries. The division can now openly
claim to be the focal point of communica-
tions between the subsidiaries and the
parent company and may establish a
system of planning that reflects the views
of both the division and the subsidiaries.
Now it must be the main agent for trans-
ferring and managing corporate resources.
Yoshino found that only three of the 30
companies with an international division
had reached this third stage of maturity,
and that the remaining 27 were at various
points in the second stage. International
operations are still a recent phenomenon
even in leading Japanese manufacturing
corporations.
2. Organz'zaNonal RelaNonshz'ps ~'n Japa-
nese Joint-ventures
Sim Ah Ba made a comparative study
of the organizational relationships between
Malaysian subsidiaries and their foreign
parent companies [Sim 1978: 60]. He
examined the degree of decentralization of
authority in decision-making in Malaysian
subsidiaries of American, British, and
Japanese parent companies. According
to his study,l) there is less decentralization
in the Japanese subsidiaries both from the
parent company or joint-venture board
and within the subsidiary company itself.
This pattern of centralization in Japanese
enterprises is thought to reft.ect their way of
controlling the subsidiaries by means of
operaNonal control rather than equity
ownership.
One of the major characteristics of
Japanese direct investment is Japanese
companies' willingness to accept a minority
position in joint-ventures. 2 ) In fact, among
the Japanese manufacturing joint-ventures
listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Ex-
change as of the end of 1982, the highest
1) Twenty sample firms were selected for the
study using a careful matching method. Seven
British and American firms were selected with
six Japanese firms. For each sector (con-
sumers' products I, consumers' products II,
pharmaceutical, chemical, transportation ma-
chinery, electrical, electronics, and textiles) it
intended to include at least one firm originating
from each of the three countries, though this
was not possible where suitable companies could
not be found. Information appears to have
been collected using intensive interviews lasting
six to seven days for each company from April
to November, 1974. Although the latter half
of the study on the relationship between de-
centralization and the performance of sub-
sidiaries, is rather scanty and crude, many
interesting findings, though they are not well
organized, are contained in the first half of his
study.
2) See K. Y oshihara [1978].
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Japanese equity share, including that of
Japanese trading or financial partners,
was only 49 percent [The Kuala Lumpur
Stock Exchange 1983]. Although overall
comparative and recent data are not avail-
able on the Malaysian side, one could say
that Japanese companies seem to accept,
or even prefer, the minority position in
their subsidiaries or joint-ventures in
Malaysia as well as in other Asian countries.
Sim's study [Sim 1978: 33-60] further
examines the practice of operational control
by Japanese parent companies over Malay-
SIan subsidiaries. First of all, he finds
that as far as the financial functions are
concerned, irrespective of the nationality
of the parent company, very little authority
is delegated to the Malaysian subsidiaries.
The financial functions here include, capital
expenditure, budgeting, target-setting,
dividend policy, and reinvestment and
financing policies. In any ]omt-venture
these are critical decisions and tend to be
retained by the parent companies. Control
is particularly tight over capital expenditure.
The executives' perception index, using
which Sim measures their perceptions of
the degree of autonomy in the area of
finance, averaged 5.0 for American, 4.57
for British and 5.17 for Japanese executives
of Malaysian subsidiaries. This index
uses a 7-point semantic differential-type
scale, ranging from one indicating a high
degree of autonomy to seven indicating
little or no autonomy. Thus, Japanese
executives feel less autonomy than US or
UK executives.
It is quite interesting to note that the
executives in the Japanese subsidiaries
13
feel less autonomy m financial policy
decision-making in spite of a great deal of
consultation with their parent companies.
An executive at a Japanese subsidiary in
the electronics sector told Sim that the sales
and profit targets were set by the head office
after consultation with him; then, the
subsidiary prepared the budget for six
months following a standard format. The
managing director usually takes this op-
portunity to visit the head office and discuss
the budget. At the same time he can keep
in touch with colleagues and superiors and
assess the climate at head office. Sim says
that this kind of interaction is particularly
important to the Japanese executive because
of the premium placed on personal contact,
discussion and group consensus.
Compared with US or UK firms, the
budget in Japanese subsidiaries usually
tends to be less rigid and can be changed if
circumstances warrant [ibid.: 37]. Usually,
direct costing methods, instead of standard
costing, are imposed on the Japanese
subsidiaries and the use of the budget as a
tool for appraisal of performance is rather
loose. For capital expenditure, no formal
authority levels are imposed on the Japanese
subsidiaries, while the executives in US and
UK subsidiaries complain about the low
formal authority levels they are given by
their parent companies. All this suggests
that the Japanese subsidiaries in Malaysia
enjoy a greater degree of freedom, at least
in a formal sense. However, in the real
decision-making process, informal con-
sultations and negotiations are far more
important. Describing the decision-
making process behind the ringi system,
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Yoshino [1979: 158-166] also stressed the
importance of informality in Japanese
management. One must say, therefore,
that the financial policy of the Malaysian
subsidiaries of Japanese origin is still
controlled by their parent companies.
According to Sim's study [Sim 1978:
39-44J, personnel policy, including (a)
appointment of top management executives,
(b) personnel policies and practices and,
(c) training, in the Malaysian subsidiaries
of foreign companies tends to be decentral-
ized to the subsidiaries, except for the ap-
pointment and salaries of expatriate per-
sonnel and key local executives. Since,
however, manpower is largely governed by
the budget, the subsidiaries have to obtain
the approval of the head office to increase
their staff.
In all the Malaysian subsidiaries of UK
or US origin (14 firms) surveyed by Sim Ah
Ba, the chief executive officer's position was
occupied by personnel from the parent
companies. Most Malaysian subsidiaries
of Japanese origin are minority Japanese
joint-ventures. Their parent companies
do not emphasize the position of chief
executive in controlling Malaysian sub-
sidiaries. According to Sim's survey,
however, the average number of expatriate
personnel is largest in Japanese subsidiaries;
in 1973,5.5 persons for Japanese subsidiaries,
and 2.57 and 2.86 for British and American
subsidiaries respectively. This finding is
also confirmed by our own survey in 1982.
According to Sim's survey, the Japanese
expatriate personnel are concentrated in
technical/production positions and, to a
lesser extent, in top financial and admin-
istrative posItIOns, while in UK and US
subsidiaries they are mainly found in the
positions of chief executive and marketing
officer. Sim believes that this is due to the
Japanese collective approach to manage-
ment [ibid.: 40] and asserts that emphasis
is placed on operational rather than equity
control.
In the procurement of imported machin-
ery and equipment Malaysian subsidiaries
of Japanese origin do not show any differ-
ence from US and UK subsidiaries. Nor
is there any noticeable difference in the
degree of decentralization of marketing
policy except pricing between Japanese
subsidiaries and UK or US firms [ibid.:
49-53]. Although many of the Malaysian
subsidiaries have general guidelines on
pricing from their head office, there seems
to be considerable degree of decentraliza-
tion in the pricing of final products. How-
ever, Sim noted that British subsidiaries
are the most decentralized, and the Japanese
subsidiaries are the least in pricing [ibid.:
51]. Decisions on sales promotion and
distribution are decentralized to the
Malaysian subsidiaries irrespective of their
national origin. On the other hand, export
policy is a centralized function, with the
parent company retaining authority. De-
CISIOns on organizational policies, like
hierarchy, span of control, type of organiza-
tion, use of committees, and organizational
changes seem to be decentralized to a
high degree in the Malaysian subsidiaries
of Japanese origin as well as in US or UK
subsidiaries [ibid. : 54- 56]. In the re-
maining policy areas, including personnel
policies toward local staff, policies on
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production planning and inventory, policies
on promotion and distribution, and policy
on organizational matters within the sub-
sidiaries, the Malaysian subsidiaries of
foreign origin have the authority to make
their own decisions.
Usually a multinational corporation
regards its own operation as if it formed an
internal market centered on the parent
company, with its network of foreign
subsidiaries. But this internal market
must operate under the centralized
system of optimal management because the
mechanism of the market is not through
price adjustment. In this sense, policy
decisions, particularly related to the alloca-
tion of capital, technology and management
resources, must be centralized at the center
of such operations, namely the parent
company. On the other hand, decisions
on the management of immobile economic
resources are left to the authority of foreign
subsidiaries.
Management of the internal market (or
the internal division-of-Iabor) by Japanese
corporations is not different in substance
from that in US or UK corporations. Al-
though Sim Ah Ba gives collective or team
management as the central characteristic
of international business in Japanese enter-
prises, the features he mentioned, such as
the importance of informal consultation
and exchanges of views in the decision-
making process, a large number of Japanese
personnel in foreign subsidiaries, the im-
portance of personal contact in communica-
tion and frequent visits from and to the
parent company, are not necessarily asso-
ciated with the essence of Japanese inter-
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national business operations. They may be
simply associated with the premature stage
of organizational evolution in Japanese
firms in relation to their international
operations.
Yoshino points out that international
operations are still a comparatively recent
phenomenon even in leading Japanese
manufacturing companies. Organizational
development in relation to international
business is still to come. Thus, we should
understand that the operatz"onal control
system of Japanese corporations, as char-
acterized by Sim Ah Ba, is almost exclu-
sively associated with the characteristics of
management at the present stage of the
organizational evolution III Japanese
handling of international business. As
international business increases, organiza-
tional structures and control systems will
change. In the process, the so-called
operational control system may become less
and less characteristic of typical Japanese
international business management. In
the mean time, the degree of centralization
may be further increased until most Japanese
manufacturing companies enter the third
phase as defined by Stopford and Wells.




ventures of Japanese Origin
1. Malaysian Manufacturing Subsidiaries
ofJapanese Origin
As Table 1 shows, the average paid-up
capital of the Japanese subsidiaries or
joint-ventures surveyed is four times as
345
Table 1 Information on the Japanese Subsidiaries
or Joint-ventures Surveyed l )
be that our sample is biased
toward capital intensive
and large scale firms, but
this does not seem to distort
the following analysis.
Japanese manufacturing
subsidiaries seem to pay the
average wage prevailing
in the Malaysian market
for unskilled workers but
a slightly lower rate for
administrative staff. Al-
though the figures for sales
profit rate are crude, our
Japanese manufacturing
subsidiaries seem to be
earning almost the same
rate of profit on sales as all
Malaysian manufacturing
firms.
Since the early 1970s, the
New Economic Policy has
been intensively imple-
mented in Malaysia. One
of its important objectives is
to balance the employment









one declared objective of
the policy is to achieve the
following composition of
employment in the manu-
facturing sector by 1990; 50 percent Malays,
40 percent Chinese, 9.6 percent Indian and
0.4 percent other, miscellaneous races. In
this respect, as Table 2 shows, the re-
spondent joint-ventures of Japanese origin
seem to have over-responded in terms of
total employment of Malays. 3)















5) Data are not available.
6) Simple average per employee (including both administrative
personnel and workers).
Items
Notes to Table 1
1) All figures are simple averages.
2) Total Sales Value and Rate of Profit on Sales for Japanese
firms are for 1979. Other figures are those for 198!.
3) The figures for Malaysian manufacturing firms are those for
the end of 1979.
4) Data source: Malaysia, Department of Statistics. 1982.
Report of The Fz'nanct"al Survey of Lz'mz'ted Companies
Malaysz'a, 1979. This report covers the manufacturing
companies with total sales value of five million M$ per year
or more.
Rate of Profit on Sales (%/Year) I 6. 6 I





Paid-up Capital (Million M$), I 25.03 I
per Company




Total Sales Value per Company I 43. 12 I(Million MS/Year)
Japanese or Foreign Equity
Share (%/Year)
large as that of all Malaysian manufacturing
firms. On the other hand, the average
number of employees per firm is almost the
same for both. Thus; the capital-labor
ratio is much higher in the companies we
surveyed than in most Malaysian manu-
facturing firms. In terms of gross sales
values, too, the former are larger. It may
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3) In fact, this racial composition is required by
the plan at all levels of status.
Table 2 Racial Composition of Employees
_____.__--'I~alayIChinese IIndian \Others
Notes to Table 2
1) Data Source: Malaysia, Department of
Statistics. 1980. 1976 Report of the Labour
Force Survey. August. Therefore, all
figures for Malaysian manufacturing firms
are those for 1976.
2) Figures are those for 1981.
for the companies we surveyed was 1971.
Compared with the Japanese manufacturing
subsidiaries or joint-ventures III other
ASEAN countries, only those in Thailand
were established, on average, earlier. Thus
the Japanese subsidiaries or joint-ventures
in Malaysia have accumulated more than
10 years of experience to adapt their







Local Personnel I 67. 7 70. 1 91. 6(%)
-Dispatched ----
Japanese 32.3 29.9 8.4
Personnel (%)
Table 3 The Composition of Local and
Japanese Personnel at Adminis-
trative or Supervisory Levels
According to our survey, the Japanese
equity share averages 62.4 percent. In
Malaysia, the Government controls owner-
ship of firms through guidelines which
require at least 51 percent domestic par-
ticipation in equity. There are exceptions,
however, depending on the nature of the
enterprise. Enterprises whose products
will all be exported are allowed to be wholly
foreign owned. Since there are many
Japanese manufacturing subsidiaries which
export all of their products, the average
equity share is higher than that set by the
government guidelines. It must be pointed
out, however, that many Japanese manu-
facturing joint-ventures outside the free
trade zones have a far lower Japanese
equity share than the guideline level. Here
Japanese firms' preference for a minority
equity share reveals itself. Since equity
share is usually determined at the parent
companies it may have something to do with
the localization policy Japanese executives
in Malaysia are instructed to follow.
For personnel administrative, general
administrative and supervisor's posts, local
staff are recruited intensively (see Table 3).
At the supervisor's level in particular, more














2. Basic PoNcy Stance
A localization policy seems to be the
basic management policy of most Japanese
manufacturing subsidiaries or joint-ventures.
Eighty-seven percent of Japanese top ex-
ecutives say that their general policy is
localization, while only 13 percent de-
scribe their policy as a common one which
may be applied all over the world irrespec-
tive of local conditions. The latter group
seems to consist of highly export-oriented
firms located in the free trade zones.
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occupied by local people, while the per-
centages of local recruits at personnel and
general administrative staff level are slightly
lower. Nevertheless, the average number
of expatriate Japanese staff is 9.4 persons
per subsidiary according to our survey.
This figure is higher than Sim's figures of,
2.86 persons for US manufacturing sub-
sidiaries in Malaysia or 2.57 persons for UK
subsidiaries, and even his 5.50 persons for
Japanese subsidiaries or joint-ventures
in 1973. Note, though, that Sim's study
showed a declining trend in the average
number of expatriate personnel in the
Malaysian manufacturing subsidiaries of
foreign origin. Although both sets of
figures are not directly comparable, it is
surprising that the Malaysian manufactur-
ing subsidiaries or joint-ventures of Japanese
origin still have a higher ratio of expatriate
personnel m international comparison.
This is contradictory to the localization
policy in recruiting middle management
and administrative personnel. Since policy
on sending Japanese personnel abroad is
centralized at the parent company in most
Japanese firms, this contradiction might
reflect a conflict between the international
business policy of the parent companies
and the localization policy of the local
subsidiaries. As we have already stated,
it may require an organizational evolution
of Japanese firms to reduce this contradic-
tion.
As part of their localization policies,
Japanese top executives seem to emphasize
the local procurement of components and
parts. About 58 percent of the respondents
are not satisfied with the present level of
local procurement (47 percent), while the
remaining 42 percent are. Sim's study
showed that the policy decision on pro-
curement of components and parts, par-
ticularly of import procurement, was highly
centralized at the parent company. There-
fore, top executives' responses should be
understood to reflect the parent companys'
strategy in this area of international activity.
Our finding is somewhat opposed to the
usual accusation that Japanese direct
foreign investment is largely motivated by
the desire to increase exports through
direct investment [Hirono 1969: 88].
Localization policy in the areas of tech-
nology and management ability transfer
is implemented mainly by in-company train-
ing systems, including the sending of local
staff to the parent company and on-the-job
training. About 61 percent of responses
to this question concentrate on in-company
training, but the recruitment of local
engineers and management staff is also
understood, in some cases, to be a kind of
technology and management skills trans-
fer (19.4 percent of total responses).
Another 15.5 percent of total responses
refer to the establishment of a technical
department or research and development
department as a technology or management
skills transfer policy. Since implementa-
tion of these policies involves capital ex-
penditure, the final decisions are in the
sphere of the parent company's authority,
even though consultations and discussions
between parent companies and their sub-
sidiaries or joint-ventures precede them.
Japanese top executives seem to con-
sciously apply Japanese style management
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Note to Table 4
1) Since the multiple answer system is used in
the questionnaire, total answers are more
than the number of respondents.
Table 4 Management Policies which Japa-
nese Top Management Executives
Advocate and Implement as J apa-
nese Style Management
to their Malaysian subsidiaries or Jomt-
ventures within the sphere of their authority.
Japanese style management may be inter-
preted as consisting of two major manage-
ment policies. The first is associated with
long-run remuneration policy; emphasis
is given to stability of employment, a
seniority-merit wage system, a seniority-
merit promotion system, and job rotation
and multi-skilled workman schemes (see
Table 4). The second is related to organi-
zational policy; indoctrination of man-
agement philosophy, collective decision-




Continuous Training System I 10. 4
Total I 100. 0
Note to Table 5
1) The multiple answer method was used in the
questionnaire.




In-company Promotion System I 18.1
~ Seniority-merit Promotion I
System 12.2
Oili~ I ~l
Job Rotation I 5.0
Small Group Activities I 5. 0
Housing Scheme I 2. 3
Officially Commending Long I 0 9
Service 1 .
Reconciling Human Relations I
between the Management and 11. 8
Workers
Retirement Benefit System I 6.3
Wage Incentive Scheme I 5. 9
Building up Personnel Welfare I 10 0
F~iliti9 .
tion of status differentiation between labor
and management, collective responsibility
and the rt"ngt" system (see Table 4). It has
to be stressed that these two types of
policies are jointly considered by most
Japanese top executives to compose the
Japanese style of management.
To implement Japanese style personnel
management, it is essential to keep the
local workers and staff as long as possible.
For this purpose, Japanese subsidiaries
emphasize in-firm promotion systems,
seniority-merit wage systems, emphasis
on the human relations between workers and
management, long-term oriented on-the-
job training, commendations for long ser-




















Application of Ringi System I
Collective or Team Responsibilityl
System










Stressing the Philosophy and
Aims of Management
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Table 5). The short-sighted,. high-wage
policy is not emphasized.
To squeeze the full merit from the
organizational policy mentioned above,
many Malaysian subsidiaries or joint-
ventures of Japanese origin utilize small
group activity systems such as bottom-up
suggestion schemes, QC (quality control)
circles and ZD (zero defect) movements.
Needless to say, conflicts exist between
Japanese subsidiaries or joint-ventures and
their local partners in business'management.
As Table 6 shows, for each area of manage-
ment policy, conflicts have occurred rarely.
However, conflicts whether serious or not,
do cover all areas of management policy.
Serious conflicts are mainly found in policy
areas such as dividend policy, marketing
policy, procurement policy, investment
Table 6 Conflicts with Local Partners over
Management Policies l )
--------
Seri- Slight No NoType of '. ous Con- Con- An-Management "'..... Con- flict flictPolicy .....~ flict swer
Personnel Policy 1 7 27 17
Promotion Policy 0 6 27 19
Wages and Salaries 0 7 26 19
Bonuses and 0 3 30 19Welfare Facilities
Directors' 1 3 27 21Remuneration
Dividend Policy 2 4 21 25
Investment Plans 1 7 23 21
Technology 0 2 30 20Transfer
Marketing Policy 2 8 23 19
Pricing Policy 1 4 26 21
Procurement Policy 2 1 30 19
Others 0 1 19 32
Note to Table 6
1) Figures show the number of answers to each
item.
plans and pncmg' policies, decisions on
which are within the sphere of the parent
company's authority. Similarly, half of
the minor conflicts are concentrated on
policies within the sphere of the parent
company's authority. Therefore, it could
be said that more serious and frequent
conflicts occur with local partners in rela-
tion to the international business policy of
the parent company.
3. The Remuneration System in Japanese
Subsidiaries or Joint-ventures
Among Malaysian manufacturing sub-
sidiaries or joint-ventures of Japanese origin,
incentive-based wage systems are not so
popular as fixed wage systems for workers.
Only six percent of the companies we
surveyed use incentive wage schemes as
the basic wage system. Seventy-eight
percent use a fixed wage scheme as their
basic wage system. The remaining 16
percent use a combination of incentive
and fixed wage schemes. Although directly
comparable data are not available, the
degree to which incentive-based wage
systems are used in Japanese firms seems
to be in line with the prevailing practices
m Malaysia. According to the Occupa-
tional Wage Survey for 1974 [Malaysia,
Department of Labour 1976], 15 percent
of the workers employed in establishments
employing 50-100 persons or more used
incentive wage schemes.
In determining wage scales for workers,
70 percent of our Japanese firms depend
upon the ambiguous evaluation system;
that is, the synthetic evaluation system.
Personnel evaluation records are utilized,
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however, even In periodic wage increase
schemes.
Regarding fringe benefit schemes, the
practice in Japanese subsidiaries seem to be
in line with the legal employment regula-
tions in Malaysia. Only about six percent
of our Japanese firms seem to have their
own pension schemes. This is simply due
to the legal regulations which include the
nation-wide employee provident fund
schemes. Instead of having their own
schemes, most Japanese subsidiaries give
their obligatory share of the contributions
to these employee provident fund schemes.
However, about 42 percent of our firms have
their own, once-and-for-all, retirement
schemes. In this respect, Malaysian sub-
sidiaries or joint-ventures of Japanese origin
follow the typical Japanese remuneration
system, although the amount paid under
this scheme mayor may not be in line with
Japanese practices. Most Japanese sub-
sidiaries are paying bonuses of 1.8 months'
wages per year for administrative and
supervisory staff and 1.5 months' wages per
year for workers. In Malaysia bonus
payments, particularly year-end bonus
payments, are quite a common practice.
According to government regulations com-
panies that paid more than two months'
wages as year-end bonus must pay tax on
the excess amount. Prior to the introduc-
tion of this regulation, some companies are
reported to have paid workers year-end
bonuses equal to six months to one year's
wages. Bonus payments In Japanese
subsidiaries or joint-ventures in Malaysia
are not directly related to short-run In-
centive schemes. Bonuses are paid to
- 21
workers under the name of income supple-
ment and allocation of over-all performance
merit, and/or a combination of these.
According to Thong's study [Thong 1981:
99], some companies are successfully using
bonus schemes based on merit rating, while
other companies are only partially success-
ful in doing so. One can not be sure,
therefore, whether bonuses are based on
merit rating in Malaysia or not.
As for welfare facilities, our Japanese
subsidiaries and joint-ventures are provid-
ing the following facilities: staff cafeterias,
company housing and dormitories, com-
muter buses, medical treatment and ex-
amination office, sports facilities, locker
rooms and company uniforms. In addition,
athletic meetings and annual banquets are
held by Japanese firms.
In the field of long-run remuneration
policy connected with promotion and train-
ing systems, the typical features of Japanese
management seem to have been adapted
to local conditions. For example, only
8.3 percent of the Japanese firms surveyed
rely exclusively on seniority-merit systems
for promotion. On the other hand, achieve-
ment or ability-merit systems are ex-
clusively used by 45.8 percent. In 52.1
percent both systems are combined. Fur-
thermore, in only 45.8 percent of our com-
panies is an in-company promotion system
used exclusively. In 54.2 percent, on the
other hand, an in-company promotion
system is given equal weight to recruitment
from outside. Thus, in this respect too,
typical Japanese style management has
been modified in Malaysia. In-company
promotion systems are quite closely related
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to in-company training systems in the
management of Japanese firms. In train-
ing local workers and administrative or
supervisory personnel, more emphasis is
placed on on-the-job training (48.5 percent
of all responses) and sending staff and
workers to Japan for training (28.9 percent).
Off-the-job training and job rotation are
also utilized to a limited extent (12.4 and
8.2 percent).
Thus, our survey findings show that with
respect to aspects of short-run remuneration
policy such as wage systems, fringe benefits,
pension schemes, bonus systems and per-
sonnel welfare facilities and so on, the
management practices of Japanese sub-
sidiaries or joint-ventures are highly adapted
to the local conditions. In other words,
it is hard to find any special Japanese style
management practices in this area of
management policy. On the other hand,
for aspects of long-run remuneration
policy, such as seniority-merit and in-
company promotion systems supplemented
by in-company training, our survey shows
that typical Japanese management practices
are maintained in Japanese subsidiaries
or joint-ventures, although slightly modified
and adapted to the local conditions. Japa-
nese subsidiaries or joint-ventures In
Malaysia were established on the average
in 1971, and 10 years is not long enough
for a long-run remuneration policy to be
tested in the local conditions, so that the
present modifications and adaptations may
be considered only transitional.




1. Profile of the Local Middle Managers
and Supervisors
The profiles of representative local middle
managers and supervisors who responded
to our questionnaire are as follows. Their
average age is 36.5 years, younger than
Japanese top management executives
(43.5 years old on average). Forty-five
percent of them are university graduates,
while 39 percent are high school graduates
and nine percent are polytechnic graduates.
Before joining Japanese companies they
had changed jobs on average of 2.3 times.
They joined Japanese companies from local
Chinese firms (21 percent), European
companies (19.8 percent), American com-
panies (12.3 percent), local indigenous or
non-Chinese firms (12.3 percent) and
government offices (11.1 percent). How-
ever, moving from one Japanese company
to another seems to be very rare (6.2 percent).
They have worked for their present company
over seven years on average. Although
exactly comparable data are not available,
this seems rather long according to Malay-
sian standards. For this kind of jobs,
job-hopping is common. In this sense
Japanese companies have been successful
in keeping management and supervisory
personnel much longer than other Malay-
. .Sian compames.
Table 7 shows the reasons why local
middle managers and supervisors have
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sidiaries or joint-ventures mainly because
of better prospects of advancement, more
chance of learning new technology, stable
employment, the good reputation of their
present companies and better working
conditions. It must be pointed out that
they did not give much importance to
immediate higher salary or wages and
better status or position in choosing their
present companies. In fact, only 12.5
percent of the local middle managers and
supervisors are satisfied with their cur-
rent pay. Twenty-one point two percent
are not satisfied with their current pay,
while the majority (66.2 percent) feel only
slight satisfaction. It would seem that
their current dissatisfactions are more
than compensated for by their long-run
prospects.
2. Responses of the Local Middle Man-
agers and Supervisors to Japanese
Style Management Practices
The morale of the local middle man-
agers and supervisors appears to be high.
Fifty-eight percent are very satisfied with
their present job responsibility, while
39.5 percent express satisfaction. Al-
most all of them are either very satisfied
or simply satisfied with their relationships
with their chiefs and peer group. Fur-
thermore, many of them express strong
satisfaction with their prospects of future
advancement m their companies (44.3
percent), or express simple satisfaction (49
percent), while only 6.3 percent expressed
dissatisfaction. They are all either very
proud or proud of working for their
compames.
I'F t h' h Factors whichac ors w IC •
I
Motivated the MotIvated the
E Employee to
.mployee to J' H'
i L H" oln IS





I Com an 1) JapaneseI p Y Company
Table 7 Factors Motivating Local Middle
Managers and Supervisors to Leave
Their Former Company and Join
Their Present Japanese Company
1) The multiple answer method was used for each
question.
2) Regarding these factors, answers should be read
differently in cases of "Transfer From" and
"Transfer To" respectively. For example, for
wages and salary items, the motivating factor is
lower wages and salary for "Transfer From"
while it is higher wages and salary for "Trans-
fer To".
3) For these items, there was no corresponding
item for "Transfer From".
l. Wages or Salary2) 8.5% 6.0%
2. Management Policy2) 12.0
3. Stability of 10.3 15.5Employment Status2)
4. Future Prospects for 26.5 19.4Promotion2)
5. Possibility of Learning 11. 1 18.1New Technology2)
6. Human Relations in 6.8the Company2)
7. Offer of Higher 8.2Status 3)
8. Good Working 9. 1Conditions3)
9. High Reputation of 13.4the Company3)
10. Others 24.8 10.3
Total 100.0 100.0
Notes to Table 7
stayed with Japanese companies for
comparatively long periods. Local middle
managers and supervisors left their former
companies mainly because of poor pros-
pects of advancement, inadequate man-
agement, little chance of learning new
technology and unstable employment. On
the other hand, they chose Japanese sub-
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Many of the local middle managers and
supervisors seem to have a feeling of
participating in the management of their
companies, and of commitment· to them.
Seventy-five percent feel definitely com-
mitted to their companies and 62 percent
feel they participate in the management of
their companies. Almost all the remainder
also express feelings of satisfaction with
their participation and commitment.
A puzzling finding is, however, that the
majority of the local middle managers and
supervisors (63 percent) express dissatisfac-
tion with the management practices of
their companies, calling them authoritative
(top-down) management. Although the
remainder feel their companies practice
participative bottom-up management, the
majority VIew IS contradictory to the
findings summarized hitherto. Since the
questionnaire did not contain any questions
that can reconcile such contradictory re-
sponses, we can only speculate on the basis
of the foregoing information. The organi-
zational structure of most Japanese manu-
facturing corporations in relation to their
international business has not evolved to
the third stage where a functional division
of management is made between the parent
company and its subsidiaries, and standard-
ization and systematization of management
practices are not well established. Therefore,
the Japanese parent companies are still
operationally controlling their subsidiaries
or Jomt-ventures. Thus, the local middle
managers or supervisors feel that the parent
companies always have the decision-making
authority. Since such a decision-making
process appears to be ambiguous and CIr-
cumstantial with no systematization of con-
trol, local managers or supervisors may see
the parent companies' decision as authorita-
tive.
Communication barriers between Japa-
nese staff and local middle managers and
supervisors do not seem to be as substantial
as many people fear; about 56 percent of the
latter feel that there are communication
barriers between themselves and Japanese
staff. As factors contributing to these
barriers, they give the following: the lan-
guage barrier, the tendency of Japanese
staff to form a closed and exclusive circle,
no personal relations outside the work
place between Japanese staff and local
staff, value differences, Japanese staff's
short-stay with the subsidiary company,
religious differences, the tendency of Japa-
nese management to be geared too much
to the head office in Japan, and differences
in customs. Chee Peng Lim and Lee Poh
Ping [1983: 248] mentioned almost the
same factors as communication and lan-
guage barriers in Japanese joint-ventures
in Malaysia. However, the language of
business in Malaysia is English, and most
Japanese staff sent to Malaysia are com-
petent enough in English to make it seem
that the language barrier should not be too
senous. Other factors are almost equally
diversified in the responses to our survey.
They are just the usual barriers to mutual
understanding between people with different
cultural, social and historical backgrounds.
I t is hardly conceivable that the communica-
tion barriers due to these factors are un-
surmountable in the companies where more
functional human relations prevail.
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3. Their Own Management Practices in
Japanese Subsidiaries and Jo'int-
ventures
The local middle managers and super-
visors seem to recognize the merits of group-
ism in their own daily management prac-
tices. They usually have group meetings
with their subordinates 1.5 times a month
and 53 percent have such group meetings
regularly. They hold these meetings
mainly for the purposes of problem-solving
and goal-setting, and seldom consider that
they simply serve the purpose of sociability
and one-way communication. The vast
majority (99 percent) are trying to encourage
team-work and achievement of group
objectives rather than individual perfor-
mance. Furthermore, they recognize the
importance of groupism even among their
own fellow managers. Ninety-three per-
cent are ready to look after a fellow
manager's work if he is unexpectedly sick.
As regards incentives to motivate local
workers, they give good human relations,
money incentives and excellent leadership
encouraging team-work as important
factors. It is worthwhile noting that such
intrinsic factors as good human relations
and leadership encouraging team-work
are also recognized as important incentives
in Malaysia. According to an existing
study [Ibrahim and Moktar bin Haji
Ibrahim 1978 : 57-62] , most skilled and
unskilled workers in Malaysia give higher
ratings to extrinsic factors such as pay, job
security, fringe benefits and so on rather
than intrinsic factors to motivate them.
The fact that Japanese subsidiaries and
joint-ventures give much more importance
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to intrinsic factors III their labor policy
is not irrelevant to workers' remuneration
systems and their future prospects in the
long-run.
The majority of local middle managers or
supervisors attach much importance to
mensualization in their daily management
practices. For example, ninety percent
of them are ready to offer friendly counselling
to their subordinates concerning their
private affairs as well as job-related matters
(4.2 times a month on average). The
majority are also willing to participate in
the sports or club activities, mixing with
general workers, to have lunch with-workers
in their company canteens, and to partici-
pate in the annual dinner party sponsored
by the company or the recreational com-
mittee. Most of them do not think that
managers should be provided with a com-
pany restaurant separated from the canteen
for workers. Fifty-one percent do not
think that managers should be given their
own private offices, although private
offices are still a status symbol in the
Malaysian society.
IV Conclusions
Malaysian subsidiaries and joint-ventures
of Japanese origin can hardly be considered
independent business enterprises as defined
III textbooks. Decision-making authority
III important areas of management policy
is retained by the parent company.
Within their limited range of decision-
making authority, however, Japanese
subsidiaries and joint-ventures in Malaysia
are consciously trying to apply typical
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Japanese style management, particularly
in the fields of long-run remuneration and
organizational policy. These two policies
must be understood to be complementary
in the context of Japanese management.
The essence of such a management system
lies in stressing the long-run perspective
for remuneration and advancement within
the internal labor market.
It is rather a difficult theoretical question
whether such internal labor markets will be
compatible with the Malaysian labor
market. To answer this question is be-
yond the scope of the present paper but, at
least according to the responses from the
local middle managers and supervisors,
it seems possible to assert that they are
compatible in Malaysia.
Conflicts with Japanese management can
rather be found in policy areas where
decision-making authority is centralized
at the parent company. The characteris-
tics of the Japanese management system in
these fields may be, however, simply related
to the premature stage of organizational
evolution of Japanese corporations in rela-
tion to their international business. As they
accumulate experience, such characteristics
may disappear or change. In that sense
they may be transitional phenomena.
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